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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
The changes in the prices of petrol that have taken place during the last three decades 
have generated a growing interest in the determinants of petrol consumption. Those 
analyses have focused both on the effectiveness of fiscal measures as instruments for 
reducing demand and o obtaining reliable predictions about the impact that income 
growth may have on future transport demand. The attention paid to the estimation of 
price and income elasticities has not been matched by the interest in the redistributive 
effects of petrol taxation. The latter is, nevertheless, a very relevant issue, given that in 
most cases the opposition to higher taxes on petrol in order to control demand relies on 
arguments related to the supposedly regressive character of such taxes.  
 
In this paper we analyse the determinants of petrol expenditure in Spain, as well as the 
redistributive effects generated by its taxation. We use micro data from the Spanish 
Household Budget Survey (Encuesta de Presupuestos Familiares, EPF) of 1990/911. 
The household is defined as the unit of analysis. It is important to stress the fact that we 
work with a cross-section sample obtained when there was no freedom of pricing in the 
Spanish retail market for petrol. Because of this fact, we are unable to observe variations 
in petrol prices faced by the different households in the sample. This makes it impossible 
to include a price variable in the model. Therefore, our estimation needs to be interpreted 
as an expenditure function, and not as a demand one.   
 
One of the main determinants of petrol consumption is car ownership. Given that income 
influences both petrol consumption and car purchase decisions, the model needs to take 
both processes into account. Therefore, we firstly estimate a car ownership model for the 
households in our sample. At a second stage, and conditional on the number of cars 
owned, we estimate the petrol consumption equation. The use of this two-stage method 
                                                  
1 Because of this, all incomes and values refer to this year. Between 1990 and 2000 the Spanish CPI has 
increased by 47%, while disposable per capita income has risen around 84%. Both figures should be 
taken into account when interpreting the results of this paper. 
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makes it possible to estimate income elasticities of petrol consumption that are 
conditional on the number of cars owned as well as non-co ditional ones. 
 
A further interest of the paper lies in the fact that we identify the different redistributive 
effects that petrol taxation may have in different geographical areas. If petrol 
consumption patterns are not hom geneous across the country, the redistributive effects 
of petrol taxes will also vary. However, given the small size of the subsamples for some 
of the cities, it is not possible to calculate those redistributive effects directly from the 
sample information. Using the estimated expenditure function, the petrol expenditures of 
a standard household in different geographical areas and for different income levels will 
be simulated. 
 
 The paper is structured as follows. The second section details the modelling procedur , 
while the third discusses the characteristics of the database. Model estimation is carried 
out in the fourth section. Afterwards, a more detailed discussion of the income 
elasticities is presented. The sixth section focuses on the calculation of redistributive 
effects. In the last section the main conclusions are summarised. 
 
2. MODELLING PETROL CONSUMPTION 
 
Household decisions about petrol consumption essentially depend on the price of petrol, 
household income, household structure, residential location and other socioeconomic 
variables. At the same time, most of these variables also influence vehicle ownership, 
which in turn is one of the main determinants of petrol consumption. The consumer 
theory underlying such transport demand studies suggests that decisions on car 
ownership and car use should be simultaneously estimated2. In this paper, petrol 
consumption is treated as a proxy for vehicle use. This leaves us with two interrelated 
decisions that should be estimated: a discrete demand model for vehicle ownership and a 
continuous petrol consumption function, which is conditional on the number of vehicles 
owned. This way of proceeding allows for changes in the vehicle stock as a response to 
                                                  
2 The theoretical framework for discrete-continous models and its application to vehicle type choice and 
use can be found in Mannering and Winston (1985), Train (1986) and Hensher et al.(1990). 
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variations in the exogenous variables and, therefore, to includ  long-term adjustments in 
the estimated elasticities and distributional effects. 
 
As has been previously noted, we observe a unique petrol price for different households. 
This forces us to treat prices as fixed in the petrol consumption function and, therefore, 
to interpret it as an expenditure function (Engle curve) and not as a demand function. 
Price effects will be captured by the constant term in the econometric estimation. 
  
The discrete decision on vehicle ownership has been estimated with an ordered probit 
model. This model is based on a latent variable y* measuring the underlying desire for 
car ownership that can be expressed as 
 
eb += Xy*  (1) 
 
where X is a set of explanatory variables and e i  random term. What we really observe 
is the number of cars owned by the household. With the help of variable y* we can 
express the number of cars owned, y, as 
 
y=0 if  y*< 0 
y=1 if 0< y*<m1 
y=2 if m1< y*<m2 (2) 
. 
.   
y=J if mJ -1< y* 
 
where the m are unknown parameters that need to be join ly estimated with b. With this 
specification, the probit model estimates the probability that a household has none, one, 
two, or J cars3, where J³3. Thus, we restrict the last choice (J ) to owning more than two 
cars. Therefore,  
 
                                                  
3 For a discussion of the characteristics of the ordered probit model, see for instance Greene (2000). 
 
 4
Prob(y=0) = F(-Xb) 
Prob(y=1)= F(m1-Xb)- F(-Xb) 
Prob(y=2)= F(m2-Xb)- F(m1-Xb) 
Prob(y=J)=1- F(mJ -1-Xb) 
 
where F is the standard normal cumulative distribution function.  
 
The second modelling decision refers to the petrol consumption of the household. In 
order to model this decision we face the following problem: due to the fact that for many 
households petrol is purchased with a frequency higher than once a week, which is the 
surveying period of the database we employ, we have households reporting no petrol 
expenditure even thoug  their consumption may be positive. On the other hand, 
households that have bought petrol during the week they are surveyed, may report 
expenditure above their real consumption. In order to solve this infrequent purchase 
problem and obtain reliable data for petrol consumption, we use a two-stage modelling 
procedure. 
 
Under the hypothesis that all cases in which households owning at least one vehicle and 
reporting no petrol expenditure are due to a problem of infrequent purchase, we may 
correct the observed expenditure variable in the following way. Let reported petrol 
expenditure be represented by Y petrol consumption by Y*. If we assume that the 
expected values of expenditure and consumption are equal, we can write4: 
 
E(Yi) = E(Yi*) 
 
The expected value of petrol expenditure can also be written as the product of the 
expected expenditure for households reporting positive expenditure multiplied by the 
probability of spending a positive amount of money:
 
E(Yi) = E(Yi/Di=1) ·  p(Di=1) 
 
                                                  
4 See Deaton and Irish (1984), Blundell and Meghir (1987). 
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where D=1 if the household buys petrol during the week of reference and D=0 if it does 
not. 
 
Given the equality of expected values, it is also true that  
 
E(Yi*) = E(Yi/Di=1) ·  p(Di=1) (3) 
 
On the other hand, considering a petrol consumption function of the type 
 
E(Yi*)=j(q) (4) 
 
where q are the parameters of the consumption function, from (3) and (4) we obtain that 
 
j(q) = E(Yi/Di=1) ·  p(Di=1) 
 
and 
 
E(Yi/Di=1) = j(q)/p(Di=1) 
 
Under standard hypotheses, converting expected values into observed ones requires 
adding a random term: 
 
(Yi/Di=1) = j(q)/p(Di=1) + ei 
 
so that  
 
(Yi/Di=1) ·  p(Di=1) = j(q) + ei*, (5) 
 
 where ei* = ei ·  p(D=1) 
 
Therefore, petrol consumption is approximated by the product of observed expenditure 
times the probability of observing positive expenditure. Due to potential 
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heteroscedasticity problems of the new random term, it may be useful to estimate the 
covariance matrix using a robust method, such as White's. 
 
The probability of observing positive petrol expenditure is estimated separately for 
households owning different number of cars with a probit model 
 
Pj(D=1) =  F(Zjg)  
 
for j = 1, ..., J where j is each car ownership level, and Z are the explanatory variables of 
the decision of whether to spend or not. Therefore, this first stage corrects petrol 
expenditure for those households that declare positive values in order to approximate 
real consumption by a corrected measure of expenditure. 
 
At a second stage, we estimate a petrol consumption equation for households owning 
one or more cars. Available empirical evidenc  suggests that the coefficients of the 
explanatory variables that affect petrol consumption of these households may vary with 
the degree of motorisation. We thus adopt a flexible approach whereby a general 
equation is initially specified in which the explanatory variables are multiplied by 
dummies related to the number of cars owned by the household. A simplification process 
based on the coefficients’ significance leads to a final specification where the only 
variation between the types of households refers to the intercepts and income 
coefficients.  
 
This result can, nevertheless, be biased, given the fact that the continuous equation is 
conditional on the particular outcome of the discrete choice model and it may be subject 
to selection bias. In order to correct for this bias we use the classical Heckman approach, 
modified for the ordered probit model case (see, for example, Ermisch and Wright, 
[1993]). Given that the coefficient of the inverse Mill’s ratio is not significantly different 
from zero5, the estimated coefficients of the rest of the variables remain practically 
invariable and the introduction of the Mills ratio can result in notorious multicolinearity 
                                                  
5 The appendix contains the models that were estimated in th s sp cification process.  
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probems, our final specification of the petrol consumption equation does not correct for 
selection bias.  
 
To sum up, the procedure employed to estimate the impact that income has on petrol 
consumption and to evaluate the redistributive effects of petrol taxation is the following: 
We firstly estimate the probabilities of different degrees of car ownership with the 
ordered probit model in (1) and (2). After correcting petrol expenditure to approximate 
petrol consumption, we specify a consumption equation for those households with a 
positive number of cars. Finally, with the help of information about petrol taxation, it will 
be possible to assess the importance of its redistributive effects. 
 
3. THE DATA 
 
We employ a sample of 20,934 households included in the 1990/91 EPF6. Several 
variables collected in this survey will be used to construct our exogenous variables. The 
EPF provides two variables that can be used as a measure of household income: current 
income and total expenditure, both in annual terms. The choice among them has been the 
object of some debate in the literature measuring redistributive ffects. The discussion 
refers firstly to whether taxation should be measured with respect to current or 
permanent income, and in the latter case, the way in which such income may be 
approximated. There appears to be a certain degree of consensus on the use of 
permanent income as a way of determining lifetime redistributive effects. Besides, when 
no data from different periods are available, it is common to proxy permanent income by 
current consumption on the assumption that current expenditure is relatively stable with 
respect to income changes regarded as transitory (Poterba 1991, Alperovich et al. 1999). 
Another reason for not using current income is the significant downward bias to which it 
may be subject because of underreporting by the surveyed houeholds. T erefore, we 
interpret current expenditure as a proxy of permanent income, assuming that households 
maintain relatively stable consumption patterns that match their lifetime income more 
accurately than current income. 
                                                  
6 The whole EPF sample consists of 21,155 households, but exclude those from the Spanish northafrican 
cities of Ceuta and Melilla given that information on some explanatory variables was not available for 
those cities. 
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The following variables will be used in the different stages of the modelling analysis: 
 
- PETROL expenditure 
- Household INCOME, proxied by current expenditure. 
- Number of ADULTS 
- Number of CHILDREN 
- Number of EMPLOYED members of the household. 
- Number of RETIRED members of the household. 
- Age of the head of the household: AGE1 if younger than 25, AGE2 if between 25 and 
35, AGE3 if between 35 and 55, AGE4 if between 55 and 65, and AGE5 if older than 
65. 
- Years of EDUCATION of the head of the household. The EPF reports education 
levels, which have been converted into equivalent years of studies. 
- Number of CARS  
- Number of MOTORCYCLES. 
- Size of the municipality of residence. We define categories for each of the cities with 
population over half a million (in decreasing size, MADRID, BARCELONA, SEVILLA, 
VALENCIA, MALAGA and ZARAGOZA) and three categories containing all other 
municipalities: LARGE (between 100,000 and 500,000 residents), MEDIUM (between 
10,000 and 100,000) and SMALL (less than 10,000). 
- QUALITY of the road network. This variable is calculated as the length of the road 
network in each province corrected by the population and size of the province.
 
Table 1 summarises the main descriptive statistics of the variables, as well as the sample 
distribution according to size of the municipalities of residence. 
 
Given that petrol taxation amounts to a fixed percentage of petrol consumption, its 
redistributive effects will depend on the relative shares of petrol consumption in different 
income groups. As a first approximation to the evaluation of the redistributive impact, 
Figure 1 shows the share of petrol in total expenditure for the population sampled in the 
EPF. It can be observed that the share of petrol expenditure, and thus petrol taxation, 
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rises up to the fifth decile, subseq ently falling. Petrol taxation can therefore be defined 
as progressive for the poorer half of the population but regressive for the richer one. 
However, we attempt to define those redistributive effects more precisely. With the help 
of the consumption model it is possible to simulate the petrol consumption for different 
household types and different income levels. This will enable us to approximate the 
redistributive effects of petrol taxation in different geographical areas. This approach 
circumvents he problem of absence of information for certain household categories that 
are not well represented in the available sample. 
 
4. ESTIMATION RESULTS 
 
This section shows and comments on the estimation results of the models put forward in 
Section 2. As already mentioned, car ownership probabilities are estimated with an 
ordered probit model with four categories for the dependent variable: no car, one car, 
two cars and more than two cars. It has to be pointed out that the interpretation of the 
coefficients of an ordered probit model is not direct. A coefficient cannot be identified 
with the regressor's marginal effect on probability. Computing the marginal effects 
requires an evaluation of the standard normal density function for given values of Xb. 
Only in the xtremes of the probability function can the signs of the coefficients be 
directly interpreted. A positive coefficient implies a negative impact on the probability 
that the household has no car and a positive one on the chances that it has more than 
two. The impact on the intermediate categories (one or two cars) is ambiguous and 
depends on the corresponding values of the distribution function. 
 
Estimation results of the car ownership model are shown in Table 2, where some equality 
restrictions have been imposed on the coefficients of the city of residence dummies: 
Madrid and Barcelona are jointly defined as the category of reference, a second variable 
identifies households living in Valencia, Sevilla, Malaga or Zaragoza, while the rest of 
the coefficients are not constrained. None of the restrictions involved in these groupings 
is rejected by the data. The results show that the probability that a household has no car 
is lower, the larger the municipality of residence. Ceteris paribus, the highest probability 
that a household owns no car is found in Madrid and Barcelona, with the lowest value 
corresponding to the smallest localities. This result is in accordance with a priori 
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expectations, given that Madrid and Barcelona are Spain’s biggest cities, have the largest 
public transport networks and suffer the worst congestion problems, with the lowest 
circulation speeds for private cars and the highest parking prices. As expected, car 
ownership levels rise with income, education of the head of the household and the 
number of adults and workers in the household. The age of the head of the household 
also has a significant effect on car ownership: those younger than 25 or older than 55 
show lower probabilities of owning cars than those in the age of reference (35-55). 
Finally, car ownership probabilities are directly related to the quality of the provincial 
road network 
 
Table 3 summarises car ownership probabilities in the case of a household with two 
adults, of whom only one is employed, total income of 15,025 euros and whose head of 
household has 11 years of education and is aged between 35 and 55 years. The city of 
residence is allowed to vary to show how it influences motorization levels. 
  
Once car ownership probabilities are known, we turn to the problem of estimating petrol 
consumption. As explained above, before estimating the consumption function it is 
advisable to solve the problem due to the infrequent purchase of petrol. This requires 
estimations of the probability that the household spends a positive amount in petrol 
during the survey's reference week. Tables 4 and 5 show the results of such probit 
estimations for households with one or two cars. It is assumed that households without a 
car do not consume petrol, while we observe that those with more than twovehicles 
always have positive weekly expenditure on petrol. 
  
Once the infrequent purchase problem has been corrected, we estimate the petrol 
consumption function as linear in the parameters, taking logarithms on both the 
dependent variable and household income. This results in a better fit. Besides income, 
explanatory variables include household socioeconomic variables and the municipality of 
residence. Given the possible presence of heteroscedasticity in the error term, the 
variance matrix has been robustly estimated with White's method. As explained above, 
the different impact of explanatory variables on petrol consumption according to the 
number of cars owned by the household is taken into account, allowing the interaction of 
car ownership dummies with those variables. In the final specification, shown in Table 6, 
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only income variation leads to significant petrol consumption changes in households 
owning different numbers of cars. The income elasticity of petrol consumption is lower 
for households with a igher number of cars. Given the positive correlation between 
motorization levels and income, this result reflects, at least in part, the falling income 
elasticity of petrol consumption as income increases. Results in Table 6 also show that 
petrol consumption rates are higher for those households living in municipalities with 
fewer than 10,000 habitants. The age of the head of the households also has a significant 
influence: households with younger household heads show higher consumption rates.   
 
5. INCOME ELASTICITIES 
 
The estimation of the petrol consumption function allows us to calculate income 
elasticities. This is a relevant variable in order to predict the impact that income growth 
may have on future transport demand. Given that a vehicle ownership model has been 
specified together with a continuous consumption function, it is possible to calculate 
long-term (non conditional) and short-term (conditional) income elasticities. The latter 
only take into account the direct effect that income variation has on vehicle use and 
petrol consumption, thus considering the number of vehicles owned as fixed. Long-term 
elasticities also take into account the impact on petrol consumption via increased car 
ownership as a result of higher incomes, thus adding direct and indirect effects.  
 
Income elasticities have been calculated for a standard household composed of two 
adults, of whom only one works, two children and no retired persons. The head of the 
household is assumed to be aged between 35 and 55, with 11 years of education. 
Elasticities have been calculated for four income levels, corresponding to the average 
income for each quartile, which we term high, medium-high, medium-low and low. 
Different values have been obtained for the following groups of cities: Madrid and 
Barcelona; Valencia, Sevilla, Malaga and Zaragoza; large, medium and small 
municipalities. Table 9 shows the results. 
 
Long term elasticity is shown to be around unity, decreasing as income rises. Moreover, 
demand is more elastic in large urban areas, with a high quality of public transport, than 
in medium and small municipalities, where private transport is sometimes the only 
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transport alternative. Our result is in line with the values obtained in aggregate demand 
models with respect to long-term income elasticity7. As far as we are aware, very few 
studies are available on petrol demand at household level, and none of them presents 
long-term income elasticity8. Studies using micro data concentrate on vehicle use and 
provide elasticities with respect to the number of kilometres travelled. In this context, De 
Jong (1990) reports for the Netherlands a non-conditional elasticity of 0.63. The higher 
magnitude estimated using Spanish data could be explained by two facts. First, petrol 
consumption elasticity wih respect to income captures both an increase in the number of 
kilometres travelled and a change to cars with higher horsepower, which implies higher 
petrol consumption per kilometre travelled9. Second, Spain’s GDP per head was 79% of 
the EU average in 1990, while in vehicles p r capita that percentage was 77%. If income 
elasticity decreases with the level of income, as most studies show, a higher value of the 
Spanish elasticity should be expected.  
 
Short-term income elasticity lies around 0.59 and decreases v ry slightly with the level of 
income. This implies that, on average, the direct effect accounts for 55% of the total 
long-term adjustment to income changes, whereas the rest is due to changes in the 
number of vehicles. This percentage is similar to that ob ained by De Jong (1990) and 
has also been suggested by Dahl and Sterner (1991) from aggregate studies. Moreover, 
income elasticity decreases with the number of vehicles in the household: it ranges from 
0.61 in families with one vehicle to 0.45 in families with three or more vehicles.  
 
Again, the elasticity values are in line with those obtained in aggregate studies once we 
take into account that in our study households with no vehicles are excluded from the 
sample10. Evidence based on micro data is scarcer. Kayser (1999) reports a short–term  
income elasticity of 0.49, while Dahl and Sterner (1991) present an average elasticity of 
household studies of 0.41. On the other hand, Schmalensee and Stoker (1999) estimate a 
                                                  
7 Dahl and Sterner (1991) provide a survey of petrol demand elasticities and they conclude that long-run 
income elasticity ranges between 1.16 and 1.32 whereas Espey (1998) provides a mean value of 0.81. 
8 Surveyed studies on gasoline demand at household level inclu e Archibald and Gillingham (1980), 
(1981), Berkowitz, Gallini, Miller and Wolfe (1990), Puller and Greening (1999), Kayser (1999) and 
Schmalensee and Stoker (1999). 
9 Several authors have reported the high sensitivity of vehicle-type with respect to income. See, for 
instance, Mannering and Winston (1985) and McCarthy (1996).  
10 Dahl and Sterner report short run income elasticities varying from 0.39 to 0.52; Espey (1998) reports 
a mean value of 0.39.  
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much lower value, given that part of their income effect is captured by the number of 
driving licences in the household.  
 
According to our results, in the long-term consumption is elastic with respect to income, 
which explains the substantial growth in petrol consumption in Spain in the last decade. 
This growth is due both to an increase in the number of cars per head of population and 
to an increase in the number of kilometres travelled per vehicle. In fact, the number of 
cars per thousand inhabitants in Spain has increased by 35% between 1990 and 1998, 
while the number of kilometres run has grown by 50%. Obviously those figures cannot 
be projected into the future, as there is a saturation level for the number of vehicles in a 
household. Therefore, we should expect lower values for income elasticities as real 
income rises. 
 
6. REDISTRIBUTIVE EFFECTS OF PETROL TAXATION 
 
The evaluation of the redistributive effects of petrol taxation has usually consisted in the 
comparison of the proportion of income spent on petrol by the households at the 
extremes of the income distribution (see, for instance, Chernick and Reschovsky [1997] 
or Casler and Rafiqui [1993]). The main disadvantage of such a method is that it does 
not take into account what happens in the rest of the distribution  
 
We evaluate the redistributive effects that petrol taxation generates, using an index that 
considers the whole income distribution and using household expenditure as a proxy of 
lifetime income. Given that city size has been shown to have a significant impact on 
petrol consumption patterns, our redistribution analysis will be conditioned on that 
variable. As previously pointed out, the lack of representativeness of the EPF subsamples 
for the largest cities forces us to rely on simulation techniques. The following analysis is 
based on a definition of standard household that will be used to evaluate the 
redistributive effects by modifying its income and place of residence in order to simulate 
the changes in petrol taxes paid. Defining the standard household is always somewhat  
subjective, but, in any case, the models estimated so far make it perfectly possible to 
carry out the analysis employing alternative types of households. 
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The standard household is defined as the one adopted when computing income 
elasticities in Section 5. We simulate the change in petrol consumption that takes place in 
such a household when income rises from €6,010 to €60,100 in steps of €3,005. We 
repeat this simulation for each of the areas of residence considered in the analysis.  
 
Simulation is carried out in the following steps. The ordered probit model inTable 2 
provides the probabilities of different car ownership levels. We assume that owning no 
car implies zero petrol consumption. The data indicate that households with more than 
two cars always have positive petrol expenditure. For those cases, therefore, the 
infrequent purchase problem does not apply. When one or two cars are owned, Tables 4 
and 5 provide the probabilities that a positive amount is spent on petrol. Petrol 
consumption is provided by the results shown in Table 6. Taxation as a result of petrol 
consumption is computed using the share of taxes in the price of 98 oct. petrol in 1990. 
In that year the customer price of €0.49 consisted in 63% taxes, as the following 
breakdown shows: 
 euros as % of the final price 
Price without taxes 0.18 37 % 
Excise duty 0.26 53 % 
VAT 0.05 10 % 
Total taxes 0.31 63 % 
Price with taxes 0.49 100 % 
 
We therefore calculate the taxes paid by the household as 63% of petrol expenditure. 
Table 8 shows the results of the simulations for each household income level and place of 
residence. The columns show the probabilities that the household owns one, two or more 
than two cars, the expected number of cars, the probability of positive petrol expenditure 
when one or two cars are owned, expected petrol consumption and taxes paid. These last 
two  variables are shown both in money terms and as a percentage of household income.
 
Both the probability that the household owns one or more cars and the expected number 
of cars increase with income. The probability that a household has only one car rises with 
income up to a certain level - which varies in different municipalities - nd from then on 
the likelihood that two cars are owned increases. It is also observed that, for a fixe
income level, car ownership rises as the size of the city of residence falls. Madrid and 
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Barcelona show the lowest car ownership levels, while the expected number of cars is 
maximum in localities of fewer than 10,000 inhabitants. 
 
In absolute terms, petrol consumption rises continuously with income. Similarly to car 
ownership, petrol consumption is higher in smaller localities, where private transport is 
often the only available transport alternative. 
 
The changes of the average rate of petrol taxation reveal a progressive effect in the 
lowest income levels, given that the share of taxes rises with income. This effect, 
however, vanishes when a certain income level is reached. This pattern is the same that 
has been observed in Section 3.3 using the whole EPF sample. Table 8 makes it possible 
to observe that the turning point is higher in larger cities. In the smallest localities it takes 
place between €9,000 and €12,000, while in Barcelona and Madrid petrol taxes are 
progressive for households with incomes of up to €15,000 or €18,000. The smaller the 
municipality, the earlier the progressive effect of petrol taxation disappears.  
 
The analysis so far does not allow us to answer the question of whether the overall 
redistributive effect of petrol taxation is progressive or regressive. It is clear that for the 
lower income level it is progressive, while for the higher it is regressive. In order to 
provide a clear answer we employ an index of redistribution. 
  
The redistributive effect of a tax is related to the impact it has in terms of reduction of 
vertical inequality in income distribution. A classical index used to measure such an effect 
is that of Reynolds-Smolensky (RS), defined as the change in the Gini index. A positive 
RS implies that as a consequence of the payment of the tax he Gini index falls, so that 
income distribution is more equal and the tax can be considered progressive. On the 
contrary, a negative RS would imply regressive taxation. 
 
However, the calculation of vertical inequality indexes requires knowledge of how 
income is distributed. It has already been noted that the size of the EPF subsamples 
makes it impossible to obtain reasonable approximations to such distributions at city 
level. So, we assume that the distribution of income (but not its level) for the standard 
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households we are interested in can be approximated by the distribution of income for 
those households at national level, as shown by the EPF. 
 
The redistributive effects generated by petrol taxes in each city are shown in Table 9.  It 
should be noted that the size of the redistributive effects is relatively small. This is the 
expected result, given the share of petrol expenditure in household budgets. Pazos and 
Salas (1997) measure the redistributive effects of all types of public subsidies in Spain 
and find an RS value of 0.18. In any case, low RS values do not imply that redistributive 
effects do not exist. In fact, they do exist, and as Table 9 shows, they differ among 
localities. In the largest municipalities, petrol taxes reduce inequality in income 
distribution, while in the smallest ones the opposite effect is observed. In Barcelona and 
Madrid the RS indexes amount to 0.0005, while in the other large cities included in the 
sample the falls to 0.0001. In cities of less than half a million inhabitants, petrol taxes 
have a regressive effect, which is most intense in the smallest municipalities. 
 
7. CONCLUSIONS 
 
The conclusions of this paper are twofold. On the one hand, they relate to the 
methodology employed and the estimated elasticities using micro data and, on the other 
one, to the empirical results obtained about the redistributive effects of petrol taxation. 
 
Methodologically, the study estimates transport expenditure according to the 
households’ characteristics and permanent income, proxied by cur ent expenditure. The 
analysis of petrol expenditure and the redistributive effects of its taxation faces the 
difficulty that, although the EPF provides a large sample and taxation is common to all 
citizens, both car ownership and car use vary with the locality of residence. C teris 
paribus, households in large urban centres with better availability of public transport are 
less likely to own cars than those in rural areas, whose potential mobility largely depends 
on having access to a private car. Another methodological issue stems from the fact that 
the EPF collects petrol expenditure only during one week. It is possible that during that 
period petrol expenditure and consumption differ. This problem has been solved with the 
help of a purchase frequency model, where consumption is estimated from observed 
expenditure. Once car ownership and a corrected measure of petrol consumption have 
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been estimated, we use information on petrol taxation to evaluate the redistributive effect 
of the tax. A final methodological contribution that needs to be pointed out is that the 
modelling exercises make it possible to evaluate alternative hypothetical scenarios. In our 
case, such a model has been used to simulate the case of a standard household with 
different income leves and places of residence. The characteristics of the household can 
be easily modified, and in this way the model can be used to analyse the redistributive 
effects on alternative households and/or of different tax rules. 
 
As regards the redistributive effects of petrol taxation, it should  be pointed out that a 
priori they look relatively ambiguous. For the lowest income deciles, the share of petrol 
expenditure increases with income, and thus the tax can be regarded as progressive. 
However, after a certain income level, which is not the same for all localities, the tax is 
regressive. The calculation of a common redistribution index has shown that in the 
largest cities the overall result points to a progressive effect, with petrol taxation 
reducing inequality in income distribution. This effect is less intense, the smaller the cities 
considered. In those with fewer than 500,000 residents the effects prove  to be 
regressive. For the smallest municipalities we find the most regressive effects. The 
calculation of such effects has made it clear that besides the effect that petrol taxation 
may have on controlling demand, redistributive effects exist. Moreover, such effects are 
not common to all localities. 
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Table 1. Descriptive statistics 
 
Variables Average   St. dev.  
EXPENDITURE (ptas) 14,576.35 10,027.89 
PETROL (ptas) 828.52 684.57 
ADULT 2.17 1.38 
RETIRED 0.44 0.71 
CHILDREN 0.79 1.07 
EMPLOYED 1.04 0.91 
EDUCATION 6.51 4.45 
AGE (years) 53.0 15.64 
CARS 0.74 0.67 
MOTORCYCLES  0.18 0.42 
QUALITY 143 68.23 
 
Cars per household Households % 
no car 7,721 37 
1 car 11,106 53 
2 cars 1,885 9 
3 or more cars 222 1 
 
Households with positive petrol consumption: 12,322 
 
Sample distribution by municipality size 
Madrid 508 
Barcelona 226 
Sevilla 277 
Valencia 299 
Malaga 306 
Zaragoza 342 
Large municipalities 7,901 
Medium municipalities 5,082 
Small municipalities 5,993 
Sample size 20,934 
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Table 2. Probabilities of car ownership levels. Estimation results. 
 
 
Method: ML - Ordered Probit 
 
Included observations: 20934 
Number of ordered indicator values: 4 
Convergence achieved after 7 iterations 
Covariance matrix computed using second derivatives 
 Coefficient Std. Error z-Statistic Prob.  
SEVILLA, ZARAGOZA 
VALENCIA, MÁLAGA 
0.275418 0.058758 4.687299 0.0000 
LARGE 0.342919 0.049683 6.902195 0.0000 
MEDIUM 0.408983 0.050450 8.106725 0.0000 
SMALL 0.492853 0.051818 9.511229 0.0000 
LOG(INCOME) 0.863181 0.018917 45.62918 0.0000 
ADULTS 0.121114 0.009226 13.12755 0.0000 
EMPLOYED1 0.557898 0.027111 20.57840 0.0000 
EMPLOYED2 0.781293 0.031866 24.51815 0.0000 
AGE1 -0.345182 0.072443 -4.764878 0.0000 
AGE2 0.059847 0.027406 2.183733 0.0290 
AGE3 -0.104630 0.023773 -4.401133 0.0000 
AGE4 -0.269879 0.029850 -9.041181 0.0000 
EDUCATION 0.037407 0.002288 16.34844 0.0000 
QUALITY 0.000362 0.000140 2.581451 0.0098 
            Limit Points 
LIMIT_1:C(15) 13.38716 0.273325 48.97890 0.0000 
LIMIT_2:C(16) 15.60911 0.278537 56.03970 0.0000 
LIMIT_3:C(17) 16.89787 0.282059 59.90906 0.0000 
Akaike info criterion 1.423316     Schwarz criterion 1.429772 
Log likelihood -14880.85     Hannan-Quinn criter. 1.425424 
Restr. log likelihood -20288.49     Avg. log likelihood -0.710846 
LR statistic (14 df) 10815.27     LR index (Pseudo-R2) 0.266537 
Probability(LR stat) 0.000000    
 
 
Table 3. Car ownership probabilities according to the city of residence. 
 
  Probability of owning:    Expected 
Municipality No car 1 car 2 cars 3+ cars  number of 
     cars 
 
Madrid, Barcelona 0,277 0,672 0,050 0,002 0,78 
Sevilla, Valencia, Zaragoza, Málaga 0,193 0,719 0,084 0,004 0,90 
Large municipalities 0,175 0,726 0,094 0,005 0,93 
Medium municipalities 0,158 0,731 0,105 0,006 0,96 
Small municipalities 0,139 0,733 0,120 0,008 1,00 
 
Probabilities for a household with two adults, one worker,  income of 15,025 euros and head of 
household between 35 and 55 years old with 11 years of education. 
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Table 4. Probability model of positive weekly expenditure on petrol for households with 
one car. Estimation results. 
 
Dependent Variable: PROBABILITY OF POSITIVE PETROL EXPENDITURE  
Method: ML – Binary Probit 
Included observations: 11106 
Convergence achieved after 6 iterations 
Covariance matrix computed using second derivatives 
Variable0 Coefficient Std. Error z-Statistic Prob.  
C -5.628054 0.420978 -13.36900 0.0000 
LOG(INCOME) 0.404710 0.029179 13.86978 0.0000 
ADULTS 0.142251 0.016227 8.766522 0.0000 
EMPLOYED1 0.176764 0.044174 4.001588 0.0001 
EMPLOYED2 0.163196 0.050583 3.226319 0.0013 
AGE1 0.289494 0.123763 2.339097 0.0193 
AGE2 0.207347 0.039132 5.298670 0.0000 
AGE3 0.004848 0.038940 0.124488 0.9009 
AGE4 0.044314 0.049624 0.892986 0.3719 
Mean dependent var 0.796326     S.D. dependent var 0.402747 
S.E. of regression 0.392225     Akaike info criterion 0.966421 
Sum squared resid 1707.168     Schwarz criterion 0.972349 
Log likelihood -5357.535     Hannan-Quinn criter. 0.968417 
Restr. Log likelihood -5613.564     Avg. log likelihood -0.482400 
LR statistic (8 df) 512.0569     McFadden R-squared 0.045609 
Probability(LR stat) 0.000000    
 
 
Table 5. Probability model of positive weekly expenditure on petrol for households with 
two cars. Estimation results. 
 
Dependent Variable: PROBABILITY OF POSITIVE PETROL EXPENDITURE 
Method: ML - Binary Probit 
Included observations: 1885 after adjusting endpoints 
Convergence achieved after 6 iterations 
Covariance matrix computed using second derivatives 
Variable Coefficient Std. Error z-Statistic Prob.  
C -3.426458 1.302649 -2.630377 0.0085 
LOG(INCOME) 0.260346 0.086794 2.999578 0.0027 
ADULTS 0.196943 0.038950 5.056253 0.0000 
EMPLOYED1 0.250660 0.178048 1.407823 0.1592 
EMPLOYED2 0.286171 0.176541 1.620991 0.1050 
Mean dependent var 0.908223     S.D. dependent var 0.288788 
S.E. of regression 0.284953     Akaike info criterion 0.591669 
Sum squared resid 152.6528     Schwarz criterion 0.606368 
Log likelihood -552.6477     Hannan-Quinn criter. 0.597082 
Restr. log likelihood -577.9983     Avg. log likelihood -0.293182 
LR statistic (4 df) 50.70130     McFadden R-squared 0.043859 
Probability(LR stat) 2.58E-10    
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Table 6. Estimation results of petrol consumption equation 
 
Dependent Variable: log(petrol consumption) 
Method: Least Squares 
Included observations: 10766 
White Heteroskedasticity-Consistent Standard Errors & Covariance 
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.  
C 2.028765 0.229481 8.840674 0.0000 
LOG (INCOME) 0.608801 0.015793 38.54795 0.0000 
ADULTS 0.059956 0.006927 8.655974 0.0000 
EMPLOYED1 0.150492 0.022269 6.758064 0.0000 
EMPLOYED2 0.204096 0.024592 8.299324 0.0000 
SMALL 0.062214 0.014884 4.179828 0.0000 
AGE1 0.207625 0.054387 3.817575 0.0001 
AGE2 0.170981 0.017228 9.924448 0.0000 
AGE3 -0.015170 0.017151 -0.884538 0.3764 
AGE4 -0.030852 0.023159 -1.332171 0.1828 
D2 2.368452 0.573095 4.132736 0.0000 
D2 * LOG INCOME -0.136461 0.038114 -3.580304 0.0003 
D3 3.173643 1.701619 1.865072 0.0622 
D3 * LOG INCOME -0.163729 0.110645 -1.479761 0.1390 
R-squared 0.298796     Mean dependent var 11.46604 
Adjusted R-squared 0.297948     S.D. dependent var 0.762417 
S.E. of regression 0.638818     Akaike info criterion 1.942905 
Sum squared resid 4387.765     Schwarz criterion 1.952377 
Log likelihood -10444.66     F-statistic 352.4322 
Durbin-Watson stat 1.764601     Prob(F-statistic) 0.00000 
 
D2: Dummy variable. 1 for values with two cars, 0 otherwise. 
D3: Dummy variable. 1 for values with three or more cars, 0 otherwise 
 
 
Table 7. Long and short-term income elasticities  
 
 
Long-term elasticities 
 Income level 
Place of residence High Medium-high Medium-low Low 
Madrid, Barcelona 1.35 1.17 1.04 0.89 
Sevilla, Valencia, Zaragoza, Malaga 1.21 1.05 0.94 0.83 
Large municipalities 1.17 1.02 0.92 0.81 
Medium municipalities 1.14 1.00 0.90 0.80 
Small municipalities 1.11 0.97 0.88 0.79 
 
 
Short -term elasticities 
 Income level 
Place of residence High Medium-high Medium-low Low 
Madrid, Barcelona 0.60 0.59 0.59 0.58 
Sevilla, Valencia, Zaragoza, Malaga 0.59 0.59 0.58 0.57 
Large municipalities 0.59 0.59 0.58 0.57 
Medium municipalities 0.59 0.59 0.58 0.56 
Smal municipalities 0.59 0.58 0.57 0.56 
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Table 8. Simulation results of car ownership, petrol consumption and taxation 
Madrid 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) 
6,010 0.40 0.01 0.00 0.42 0.66 0.79 138 87 2.30% 1.45% 
9,015 0.53 0.02 0.00 0.57 0.72 0.82 239 150 2.65% 1.67% 
12,020 0.61 0.03 0.00 0.68 0.76 0.84 336 212 2.79% 1.76% 
15,025 0.67 0.05 0.00 0.77 0.79 0.85 428 270 2.85% 1.80% 
18,030 0.70 0.06 0.00 0.84 0.81 0.86 515 325 2.86% 1.80% 
21,035 0.72 0.08 0.00 0.89 0.82 0.87 598 377 2.84% 1.79% 
24,040 0.73 0.10 0.01 0.95 0.84 0.88 676 426 2.81% 1.77% 
27,046 0.73 0.12 0.01 0.99 0.85 0.89 750 472 2.77% 1.75% 
30,051 0.73 0.14 0.01 1.03 0.86 0.89 820 517 2.73% 1.72% 
33,056 0.73 0.15 0.01 1.07 0.87 0.90 887 559 2.68% 1.69% 
36,061 0.72 0.17 0.01 1.11 0.87 0.90 952 600 2.64% 1.66% 
39,066 0.71 0.19 0.02 1.14 0.88 0.90 1,014 639 2.59% 1.63% 
42,071 0.71 0.20 0.02 1.17 0.89 0.91 1,073 676 2.55% 1.61% 
45,076 0.70 0.22 0.02 1.20 0.89 0.91 1,131 712 2.51% 1.58% 
48,081 0.68 0.23 0.03 1.23 0.90 0.91 1,186 747 2.47% 1.55% 
51,086 0.67 0.25 0.03 1.25 0.90 0.91 1,240 781 2.43% 1.53% 
54,091 0.66 0.26 0.03 1.28 0.91 0.92 1,292 814 2.39% 1.51% 
57,096 0.65 0.27 0.04 1.30 0.91 0.92 1,343 846 2.35% 1.48% 
60,101 0.64 0.28 0.04 1.33 0.91 0.92 1,392 877 2.32% 1.46% 
Barcelona 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11)   
6,010 0.41 0.01 0.00 0.42 0.66 0.79 139 87 2.31% 1.46% 
9,015 0.53 0.02 0.00 0.57 0.72 0.82 239 151 2.65% 1.67% 
12,020 0.61 0.03 0.00 0.68 0.76 0.84 337 212 2.80% 1.76% 
15,025 0.67 0.05 0.00 0.77 0.79 0.85 429 270 2.86% 1.80% 
18,030 0.70 0.06 0.00 0.84 0.81 0.86 516 325 2.86% 1.80% 
21,035 0.72 0.08 0.00 0.90 0.82 0.87 599 377 2.85% 1.79% 
24,040 0.73 0.10 0.01 0.95 0.84 0.88 676 426 2.81% 1.77% 
27,046 0.73 0.12 0.01 0.99 0.85 0.89 750 473 2.77% 1.75% 
30,051 0.73 0.14 0.01 1.03 0.86 0.89 821 517 2.73% 1.72% 
33,056 0.73 0.15 0.01 1.07 0.87 0.90 888 560 2.69% 1.69% 
36,061 0.72 0.17 0.01 1.11 0.87 0.90 953 600 2.64% 1.66% 
39,066 0.71 0.19 0.02 1.14 0.88 0.90 1,015 639 2.60% 1.64% 
42,071 0.70 0.20 0.02 1.17 0.89 0.91 1,074 677 2.55% 1.61% 
45,076 0.69 0.22 0.02 1.20 0.89 0.91 1,132 713 2.51% 1.58% 
48,081 0.68 0.23 0.03 1.23 0.90 0.91 1,187 748 2.47% 1.56% 
51,086 0.67 0.25 0.03 1.25 0.90 0.91 1,241 782 2.43% 1.53% 
54,091 0.66 0.26 0.03 1.28 0.91 0.92 1,293 815 2.39% 1.51% 
57,096 0.65 0.27 0.04 1.30 0.91 0.92 1,344 847 2.35% 1.48% 
60,101 0.64 0.28 0.04 1.33 0.91 0.92 1,393 878 2.32% 1.46% 
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table 8 (continued) 
Valencia 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) 
6,010 0.51 0.01 0.00 0.54 0.66 0.79 176 111 2.93% 1.85% 
9,015 0.62 0.03 0.00 0.69 0.72 0.82 288 181 3.19% 2.01% 
12,020 0.68 0.06 0.00 0.80 0.76 0.84 391 247 3.26% 2.05% 
15,025 0.72 0.08 0.00 0.89 0.79 0.85 487 307 3.24% 2.04% 
18,030 0.73 0.10 0.01 0.96 0.81 0.86 577 363 3.20% 2.02% 
21,035 0.73 0.13 0.01 1.02 0.82 0.87 660 416 3.14% 1.98% 
24,040 0.73 0.15 0.01 1.07 0.84 0.88 739 466 3.07% 1.94% 
27,046 0.72 0.18 0.02 1.12 0.85 0.89 813 512 3.01% 1.89% 
30,051 0.71 0.20 0.02 1.16 0.86 0.89 884 557 2.94% 1.85% 
33,056 0.69 0.22 0.02 1.20 0.87 0.90 952 599 2.88% 1.81% 
36,061 0.68 0.24 0.03 1.24 0.87 0.90 1,016 640 2.82% 1.78% 
39,066 0.66 0.26 0.03 1.27 0.88 0.90 1,078 679 2.76% 1.74% 
42,071 0.65 0.27 0.04 1.31 0.89 0.91 1,137 717 2.70% 1.70% 
45,076 0.63 0.29 0.04 1.34 0.89 0.91 1,195 753 2.65% 1.67% 
48,081 0.61 0.31 0.05 1.37 0.90 0.91 1,250 788 2.60% 1.64% 
51,086 0.60 0.32 0.05 1.40 0.90 0.91 1,304 822 2.55% 1.61% 
54,091 0.58 0.33 0.06 1.43 0.91 0.92 1,356 855 2.51% 1.58% 
57,096 0.57 0.35 0.06 1.45 0.91 0.92 1,407 886 2.46% 1.55% 
60,101 0.55 0.36 0.07 1.48 0.91 0.92 1,456 917 2.42% 1.53% 
Sevilla 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) 
6,010 0.51 0.01 0.00 0.54 0.66 0.79 176 111 2.93% 1.85% 
9,015 0.62 0.03 0.00 0.69 0.72 0.82 287 181 3.19% 2.01% 
12,020 0.68 0.06 0.00 0.80 0.76 0.84 391 246 3.25% 2.05% 
15,025 0.72 0.08 0.00 0.89 0.79 0.85 487 307 3.24% 2.04% 
18,030 0.73 0.10 0.01 0.96 0.81 0.86 577 363 3.20% 2.02% 
21,035 0.73 0.13 0.01 1.02 0.82 0.87 660 416 3.14% 1.98% 
24,040 0.73 0.15 0.01 1.07 0.84 0.88 739 466 3.07% 1.94% 
27,046 0.72 0.18 0.02 1.12 0.85 0.89 813 512 3.01% 1.89% 
30,051 0.71 0.20 0.02 1.16 0.86 0.89 884 557 2.94% 1.85% 
33,056 0.69 0.22 0.02 1.20 0.87 0.90 951 599 2.88% 1.81% 
36,061 0.68 0.24 0.03 1.24 0.87 0.90 1,016 640 2.82% 1.77% 
39,066 0.66 0.26 0.03 1.27 0.88 0.90 1,078 679 2.76% 1.74% 
42,071 0.65 0.27 0.04 1.31 0.89 0.91 1,137 717 2.70% 1.70% 
45,076 0.63 0.29 0.04 1.34 0.89 0.91 1,195 753 2.65% 1.67% 
48,081 0.61 0.31 0.05 1.37 0.90 0.91 1,250 788 2.60% 1.64% 
51,086 0.60 0.32 0.05 1.40 0.90 0.91 1,304 822 2.55% 1.61% 
54,091 0.58 0.33 0.06 1.43 0.91 0.92 1,356 854 2.51% 1.58% 
57,096 0.57 0.35 0.06 1.45 0.91 0.92 1,407 886 2.46% 1.55% 
60,101 0.55 0.36 0.07 1.48 0.91 0.92 1,456 917 2.42% 1.53% 
 26
table 8 (continued) 
Málaga 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) 
6,010 0.51 0.01 0.00 0.54 0.66 0.79 176 111 2.94% 1.85% 
9,015 0.62 0.03 0.00 0.69 0.72 0.82 288 181 3.19% 2.01% 
12,020 0.68 0.06 0.00 0.80 0.76 0.84 391 247 3.26% 2.05% 
15,025 0.72 0.08 0.00 0.89 0.79 0.85 488 307 3.24% 2.04% 
18,030 0.73 0.11 0.01 0.96 0.81 0.86 577 363 3.20% 2.02% 
21,035 0.73 0.13 0.01 1.02 0.82 0.87 661 416 3.14% 1.98% 
24,040 0.73 0.15 0.01 1.07 0.84 0.88 739 466 3.07% 1.94% 
27,046 0.72 0.18 0.02 1.12 0.85 0.89 814 513 3.01% 1.90% 
30,051 0.71 0.20 0.02 1.16 0.86 0.89 884 557 2.94% 1.85% 
33,056 0.69 0.22 0.02 1.20 0.87 0.90 952 600 2.88% 1.81% 
36,061 0.68 0.24 0.03 1.24 0.87 0.90 1,016 640 2.82% 1.78% 
39,066 0.66 0.26 0.03 1.28 0.88 0.90 1,078 679 2.76% 1.74% 
42,071 0.65 0.27 0.04 1.31 0.89 0.91 1,138 717 2.70% 1.70% 
45,076 0.63 0.29 0.04 1.34 0.89 0.91 1,195 753 2.65% 1.67% 
48,081 0.61 0.31 0.05 1.37 0.90 0.91 1,251 788 2.60% 1.64% 
51,086 0.60 0.32 0.05 1.40 0.90 0.91 1,304 822 2.55% 1.61% 
54,091 0.58 0.33 0.06 1.43 0.91 0.92 1,356 855 2.51% 1.58% 
57,096 0.57 0.35 0.06 1.45 0.91 0.92 1,407 887 2.46% 1.55% 
60,101 0.55 0.36 0.07 1.48 0.91 0.92 1,456 918 2.42% 1.53% 
Zaragoza 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) 
6,010 0.51 0.01 0.00 0.54 0.66 0.79 177 112 2.95% 1.86% 
9,015 0.62 0.03 0.00 0.69 0.72 0.82 289 182 3.20% 2.02% 
12,020 0.69 0.06 0.00 0.81 0.76 0.84 392 247 3.26% 2.06% 
15,025 0.72 0.08 0.00 0.89 0.79 0.85 489 308 3.25% 2.05% 
18,030 0.73 0.11 0.01 0.96 0.81 0.86 578 364 3.21% 2.02% 
21,035 0.73 0.13 0.01 1.02 0.82 0.87 662 417 3.15% 1.98% 
24,040 0.73 0.15 0.01 1.07 0.84 0.88 740 466 3.08% 1.94% 
27,046 0.72 0.18 0.02 1.12 0.85 0.89 815 513 3.01% 1.90% 
30,051 0.71 0.20 0.02 1.16 0.86 0.89 885 558 2.95% 1.86% 
33,056 0.69 0.22 0.02 1.21 0.87 0.90 953 600 2.88% 1.82% 
36,061 0.68 0.24 0.03 1.24 0.87 0.90 1,017 641 2.82% 1.78% 
39,066 0.66 0.26 0.03 1.28 0.88 0.90 1,079 680 2.76% 1.74% 
42,071 0.64 0.28 0.04 1.31 0.89 0.91 1,139 717 2.71% 1.71% 
45,076 0.63 0.29 0.04 1.34 0.89 0.91 1,196 754 2.65% 1.67% 
48,081 0.61 0.31 0.05 1.37 0.90 0.91 1,252 789 2.60% 1.64% 
51,086 0.60 0.32 0.05 1.40 0.90 0.91 1,306 823 2.56% 1.61% 
54,091 0.58 0.33 0.06 1.43 0.91 0.92 1,358 855 2.51% 1.58% 
57,096 0.56 0.35 0.07 1.46 0.91 0.92 1,408 887 2.47% 1.55% 
60,101 0.55 0.36 0.07 1.48 0.91 0.92 1,458 918 2.43% 1.53% 
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Table 8 (continued) 
Large municipalities 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) 
6,010 0.53 0.02 0.00 0.57 0.66 0.79 186 117 3.10% 1.95% 
9,015 0.64 0.04 0.00 0.72 0.72 0.82 300 189 3.33% 2.10% 
12,020 0.70 0.06 0.00 0.83 0.76 0.84 405 255 3.37% 2.12% 
15,025 0.72 0.09 0.00 0.92 0.79 0.85 502 316 3.34% 2.10% 
18,030 0.73 0.12 0.01 0.99 0.81 0.86 591 373 3.28% 2.07% 
21,035 0.73 0.14 0.01 1.05 0.82 0.87 675 425 3.21% 2.02% 
24,040 0.72 0.17 0.01 1.10 0.84 0.88 754 475 3.14% 1.98% 
27,046 0.71 0.19 0.02 1.15 0.85 0.89 829 522 3.06% 1.93% 
30,051 0.70 0.22 0.02 1.20 0.86 0.89 900 567 2.99% 1.89% 
33,056 0.68 0.24 0.03 1.24 0.87 0.90 967 609 2.93% 1.84% 
36,061 0.66 0.26 0.03 1.28 0.87 0.90 1,032 650 2.86% 1.80% 
39,066 0.64 0.28 0.04 1.31 0.88 0.90 1,094 689 2.80% 1.76% 
42,071 0.63 0.29 0.04 1.35 0.89 0.91 1,153 727 2.74% 1.73% 
45,076 0.61 0.31 0.05 1.38 0.89 0.91 1,211 763 2.69% 1.69% 
48,081 0.59 0.32 0.06 1.41 0.90 0.91 1,266 798 2.63% 1.66% 
51,086 0.57 0.34 0.06 1.44 0.90 0.91 1,320 832 2.58% 1.63% 
54,091 0.56 0.35 0.07 1.47 0.91 0.92 1,372 865 2.54% 1.60% 
57,096 0.54 0.36 0.07 1.49 0.91 0.92 1,423 897 2.49% 1.57% 
60,101 0.53 0.37 0.08 1.52 0.91 0.92 1,472 928 2.45% 1.54% 
Medium municipalities 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) 
6,010 0.55 0.02 0.00 0.60 0.66 0.79 196 123 3.26% 2.05% 
9,015 0.66 0.04 0.00 0.75 0.72 0.82 311 196 3.45% 2.17% 
12,020 0.71 0.07 0.00 0.86 0.76 0.84 417 263 3.47% 2.19% 
15,025 0.73 0.10 0.01 0.95 0.79 0.85 515 324 3.43% 2.16% 
18,030 0.73 0.13 0.01 1.02 0.81 0.86 605 381 3.35% 2.11% 
21,035 0.73 0.16 0.01 1.08 0.82 0.87 689 434 3.28% 2.06% 
24,040 0.72 0.18 0.02 1.14 0.84 0.88 768 484 3.19% 2.01% 
27,046 0.70 0.21 0.02 1.18 0.85 0.89 843 531 3.12% 1.96% 
30,051 0.68 0.23 0.03 1.23 0.86 0.89 914 576 3.04% 1.92% 
33,056 0.66 0.26 0.03 1.27 0.87 0.90 981 618 2.97% 1.87% 
36,061 0.65 0.28 0.04 1.31 0.87 0.90 1,046 659 2.90% 1.83% 
39,066 0.63 0.29 0.04 1.35 0.88 0.90 1,108 698 2.84% 1.79% 
42,071 0.61 0.31 0.05 1.38 0.89 0.91 1,168 736 2.78% 1.75% 
45,076 0.59 0.33 0.06 1.41 0.89 0.91 1,225 772 2.72% 1.71% 
48,081 0.57 0.34 0.06 1.45 0.90 0.91 1,281 807 2.66% 1.68% 
51,086 0.55 0.36 0.07 1.48 0.90 0.91 1,335 841 2.61% 1.65% 
54,091 0.54 0.37 0.08 1.50 0.91 0.92 1,387 874 2.56% 1.62% 
57,096 0.52 0.38 0.08 1.53 0.91 0.92 1,438 906 2.52% 1.59% 
60,101 0.50 0.39 0.09 1.56 0.91 0.92 1,488 937 2.48% 1.56% 
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table 8 (continued) 
Small municipalities 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) 
6,010 0.58 0.03 0.00 0.63 0.66 0.79 220 139 3.66% 2.30% 
9,015 0.68 0.05 0.00 0.79 0.72 0.82 345 217 3.83% 2.41% 
12,020 0.72 0.08 0.00 0.90 0.76 0.84 459 289 3.82% 2.41% 
15,025 0.73 0.12 0.01 0.99 0.79 0.85 564 355 3.76% 2.37% 
18,030 0.73 0.15 0.01 1.06 0.81 0.86 661 417 3.67% 2.31% 
21,035 0.72 0.18 0.02 1.12 0.82 0.87 752 473 3.57% 2.25% 
24,040 0.70 0.21 0.02 1.18 0.84 0.88 836 527 3.48% 2.19% 
27,046 0.68 0.23 0.03 1.23 0.85 0.89 917 577 3.39% 2.14% 
30,051 0.66 0.26 0.03 1.27 0.86 0.89 993 625 3.30% 2.08% 
33,056 0.64 0.28 0.04 1.31 0.87 0.90 1,065 671 3.22% 2.03% 
36,061 0.62 0.30 0.05 1.35 0.87 0.90 1,134 715 3.15% 1.98% 
39,066 0.60 0.32 0.05 1.39 0.88 0.90 1,201 756 3.07% 1.94% 
42,071 0.58 0.33 0.06 1.43 0.89 0.91 1,265 797 3.01% 1.89% 
45,076 0.56 0.35 0.07 1.46 0.89 0.91 1,326 835 2.94% 1.85% 
48,081 0.54 0.36 0.07 1.49 0.90 0.91 1,385 873 2.88% 1.82% 
51,086 0.52 0.38 0.08 1.52 0.90 0.91 1,443 909 2.82% 1.78% 
54,091 0.51 0.39 0.09 1.55 0.91 0.92 1,499 944 2.77% 1.75% 
57,096 0.49 0.40 0.10 1.58 0.91 0.92 1,553 978 2.72% 1.71% 
60,101 0.47 0.41 0.11 1.61 0.91 0.92 1,605 1,011 2.67% 1.68% 
 
Notes for table 8: 
(1) Household income, in euros 
(2) Probability of owning one car 
(3) Probability of owning two cars 
(4) Probability of owning more than two cars 
(5) Expected number of cars 
(6) Probability of positive petrol consumption when owning one car
(7) Probability of positive petrol consumption when owning two cars 
(8) Household petrol consumption, in euros 
(9) Household petrol taxes, in euros 
(10) Household petrol consumption as percentage of income 
(11) Household petrol taxes as percentage of income 
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Table  10. Redistributive effects of petrol taxation on the standard household 
 
Municipality Initial Gini Final Gini RS index 
   
Madrid 0.2576 0.2571  0.0005  
Barcelona 0.2576 0.2571  0.0005  
Malaga 0.2576 0.2575  0.0001  
Zaragoza 0.2576 0.2576  0.0001  
Sevilla 0.2576 0.2575  0.0001  
Valencia 0.2576 0.2575  0.0001  
Large municipalities 0.2576 0.2577 -0.0001   
Medium municipalities 0.2576 0.2578 -0.0002  
Small municipalities 0.2576 0.2579 -0.0003  
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Figure 1. Share of petrol consumption on total household expenditure (expenditure deciles)
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Appendix 
Table A1 
Dependent Variable: LOG(CONGAS) 
Method: Least Squares 
Date: 03/07/01   Time: 12:29 
Sample(adjusted): 1 20931 
Included observations: 10766 
Excluded observations: 10165 after adjusting endpoints 
White Heteroskedasticity-Consistent Standard Errors & Covariance 
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.  
C 2.863767 0.579436 4.942333 0.0000 
LOG(INCOME) 0.556950 0.037108 15.00883 0.0000 
ADULTS 0.054213 0.008787 6.169482 0.0000 
EMPLOYED1 0.117276 0.031760 3.692535 0.0002 
EMPLOYED2 0.143390 0.039348 3.644125 0.0003 
SMALL 0.049300 0.017085 2.885483 0.0039 
AGE1 0.225535 0.059359 3.799534 0.0001 
AGE2 0.163816 0.018800 8.713805 0.0000 
AGE3 -0.017736 0.020352 -0.871482 0.3835 
AGE4 -0.026389 0.028616 -0.922174 0.3565 
D2 2.855902 0.649330 4.398227 0.0000 
D2*LOG(INCOME) -0.164008 0.041673 -3.935585 0.0001 
D2*ADULTS -0.002599 0.016192 -0.160532 0.8725 
D2*EMPLOYED1 -0.012076 0.096686 -0.124904 0.9006 
D2*EMPLOYED2 0.068326 0.098024 0.697036 0.4858 
D2*SMALL 0.034758 0.039234 0.885932 0.3757 
D2*AGE1 -0.075503 0.164152 -0.459956 0.6456 
D2*AGE2 -0.032898 0.058797 -0.559524 0.5758 
D2*AGE3 0.036475 0.042960 0.849038 0.3959 
D2*AGE4 0.124500 0.064180 1.939846 0.0524 
D3 3.049309 1.735565 1.756954 0.0790 
D3*LOG(INCOME) -0.135819 0.113287 -1.198891 0.2306 
D3*ADULTS 0.002567 0.038054 0.067458 0.9462 
D3*EMPLOYED1 -0.407148 0.180967 -2.249847 0.0245 
D3*EMPLOYED2 -0.180948 0.141672 -1.277239 0.2015 
D3*SMALL 0.119021 0.106162 1.121130 0.2623 
D3*AGE1 0.881120 0.095912 9.186735 0.0000 
D3*AGE2 0.025610 0.241661 0.105975 0.9156 
D3*AGE3 0.194867 0.102748 1.896558 0.0579 
D3*AGE4 0.018540 0.148758 0.124633 0.9008 
MILLS RATIO 0.083781 0.052397 1.598971 0.1099 
R-squared 0.300343     Mean dependent var 11.46604 
Adjusted R-squared 0.298388     S.D. dependent var 0.762417 
S.E. of regression 0.638618     Akaike info criterion 1.943853 
Sum squared resid 4378.081     Schwarz criterion 1.964828 
Log likelihood -10432.76     F-statistic 153.6079 
Durbin-Watson stat 1.766967     Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000 
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Table A2 
 
Dependent Variable: LOG(CONGAS) 
Method: Least Squares 
Date: 03/07/01   Time: 12:30 
Sample(adjusted): 1 20931 
Included observations: 10766 
Excluded observations: 10165 after adjusting endpoints 
White Heteroskedasticity-Consistent Standard Errors & Covariance 
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.  
C 2.012636 0.232268 8.665152 0.0000 
LOG(INCOME) 0.610622 0.016022 38.11093 0.0000 
ADULTS 0.059470 0.008179 7.270621 0.0000 
EMPLOYED1 0.151477 0.023293 6.503039 0.0000 
EMPLOYED2 0.189946 0.026126 7.270519 0.0000 
SMALL 0.055515 0.016573 3.349627 0.0008 
AGE1 0.209771 0.058393 3.592427 0.0003 
AGE2 0.171310 0.018235 9.394728 0.0000 
AGE3 -0.025839 0.019602 -1.318176 0.1875 
AGE4 -0.046161 0.025668 -1.798368 0.0721 
D2 2.433113 0.593488 4.099685 0.0000 
D2*LOG(INCOME) -0.144836 0.039992 -3.621612 0.0003 
D2*ADULTS -0.001619 0.016132 -0.100382 0.9200 
D2*EMPLOYED1 -0.004144 0.096519 -0.042938 0.9658 
D2*EMPLOYED2 0.080346 0.097750 0.821950 0.4111 
D2*SMALL 0.034778 0.039253 0.886004 0.3756 
D2*AGE1 -0.081118 0.164653 -0.492660 0.6223 
D2*AGE2 -0.031572 0.058794 -0.536990 0.5913 
D2*AGE3 0.031542 0.042822 0.736576 0.4614 
D2*AGE4 0.117612 0.064048 1.836297 0.0663 
D3 2.547321 1.710414 1.489300 0.1364 
D3*LOG(INCOME) -0.118577 0.112743 -1.051744 0.2929 
D3*ADULTS 0.004269 0.037903 0.112621 0.9103 
D3*EMPLOYED1 -0.393896 0.180617 -2.180836 0.0292 
D3*EMPLOYED2 -0.167643 0.141190 -1.187360 0.2351 
D3*SMALL 0.119883 0.105947 1.131542 0.2579 
D3*AGE1 0.878289 0.095824 9.165647 0.0000 
D3*AGE2 0.033095 0.242041 0.136734 0.8912 
D3*AGE3 0.192877 0.102458 1.882497 0.0598 
D3*AGE4 0.014552 0.148521 0.097983 0.9219 
R-squared 0.300173     Mean dependent var 11.46604 
Adjusted R-squared 0.298282     S.D. dependent var 0.762417 
S.E. of regression 0.638666     Akaike info criterion 1.943911 
Sum squared resid 4379.149     Schwarz criterion 1.964209 
Log likelihood -10434.08     F-statistic 158.7906 
Durbin-Watson stat 1.767357     Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000 
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Table A3 
 
Dependent Variable: LOG(CONGAS) 
Method: Least Squares 
Date: 03/07/01   Time: 12:31 
Sample(adjusted): 1 20931 
Included observations: 10766 
Excluded observations: 10165 after adjusting endpoints 
White Heteroskedasticity-Consistent Standard Errors & Covariance 
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.  
C 2.844454 0.569296 4.996438 0.0000 
LOG(INCOME) 0.557422 0.036396 15.31550 0.0000 
ADULTS 0.054731 0.007724 7.085833 0.0000 
EMPLOYED1 0.117381 0.030813 3.809470 0.0001 
EMPLOYED2 0.158201 0.038353 4.124865 0.0000 
SMALL 0.056219 0.015458 3.636970 0.0003 
AGE1 0.223609 0.055336 4.040932 0.0001 
AGE2 0.163730 0.017870 9.162415 0.0000 
AGE3 -0.006333 0.018170 -0.348522 0.7275 
AGE4 -0.010711 0.026564 -0.403198 0.6868 
D2 2.792752 0.633479 4.408592 0.0000 
D2*LOG(INCOME) -0.156768 0.040213 -3.898406 0.0001 
D3 3.657970 1.728923 2.115751 0.0344 
D3*LOG(INCOME) -0.181551 0.111222 -1.632325 0.1026 
MILLS RATIO 0.080829 0.051806 1.560239 0.1187 
R-squared 0.298959     Mean dependent var 11.46604 
Adjusted R-squared 0.298046     S.D. dependent var 0.762417 
S.E. of regression 0.638773     Akaike info criterion 1.942858 
Sum squared resid 4386.744     Schwarz criterion 1.953007 
Log likelihood -10443.40     F-statistic 327.4831 
Durbin-Watson stat 1.764336     Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000 
 
